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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change will unsettle expectations about both land and water. Those
changes will reduce the extent to which existing resource allocations effectively
serve societal interests. In the United States, we typically rely on market
transactions to adjust property allocations as societal needs and interests change.
Markets, however, will not adequately protect the collective, as opposed to the
private, interests climate change will put at risk. Changes to underlying property
rules will be needed if those interests are to be sustained.
Of course, property rights may be the least of our concerns in a radically
changing climate; some scientists predict that large areas of the world may literally
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become too hot to support human life within a few hundred years.1 Assuming that
humanity and its institutions survive, however, property is one of several areas
where the law will need to adapt to new circumstances.2 Adapting property rules
may be both more challenging and more important than adapting law in some
other contexts. Property rules are especially sticky. They create economic and
emotional attachments as well as literal “facts on the ground” which are difficult
to remove. But, as explained below, property rules are likely to have especially
significant consequences for the ability of human societies to respond to some of
the effects of climate change, such as altered precipitation patterns and rising sea
levels. Property rules are likely to be critical, in particular, to our ability to carry
some part of nature forward to the no-analog future.3
There is a familiar story, first articulated by Harold Demsetz4 and since
repeated and elaborated on by a sizeable cadre of economists and legal scholars,
suggesting that property rights develop when they are needed and in a form that
fits that need. It would be nice to take comfort from that story. Climate change
should catalyze significant readjustment of property rights. But the evolution of
new property rules in response to climate change will be a difficult, and quite
probably slow, process. The changes that climate change calls for will largely be
toward weaker, rather than stronger, individual property rights. Strong property
rights encourage moral hazard, increasing the costs of adaptation to a warmer
world, and may stand directly in the way of societal adaptation. In addition, the
gains from adaptive change are likely to be diffuse, while the losses will be sharply
concentrated. In many ways, as a selective pressure on property regimes, climate
disruption is reminiscent of the recognition of environmental protection as an
important social goal in the second half of the twentieth century. The evolution of
property rights in response to climate disruption will face all the hurdles that have
plagued the similar evolution over the last several decades in response to
environmental protection goals, in heightened form.
This Article examines the need for adaptive evolution of property rights in
the face of climate change, the likelihood of adaptive change, and the paths that
evolution might take. It begins by recounting the conventional economic story of
the evolution of property rights toward increased private ownership. It then
1. See Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change Due to
Heat Stress, 21 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9552, 9555 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 61–63 (2010); Holly Doremus,
Adapting to Climate Change Through Law that Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 45 (2010) [hereinafter Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change]; Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws
for a Changing World: An Approach for Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012);
J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L.
363, 395–99 (2010).
3. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog
Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2008).
4. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967).
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proceeds to consider how and why climate disruption will require adjustments to
the rules of property ownership, and why those adjustments must run in the
direction of weakening, rather than strengthening, individual property claims.
Finally, it evaluates possible mechanisms for change.
The lesson from this analysis is that there is no room for complacency. J.B.
Ruhl predicts that the need for climate adaptation will bring rapid evolution of
property rights and liability rules.5 I am not so sanguine. Biologists know that
evolution is not a matter of inevitable rapid progress toward some higher or better
state. So do many social scientists—social Darwinism, after all, was rejected long
ago. Evolution is a process of random change that is driven by selective pressures
but also strongly historically contingent, and therefore path dependent. It is not
necessarily unidirectional. It may be slow or fast. It produces as many losers—
progeny not well suited to the conditions they face—as winners with increased
fitness.
The “evolution” of law is both like and unlike the evolution of organisms.
Law evolves like species in the sense that changes are historically contingent;
changes in law always proceed from the prior state rather than starting on a clean
slate, and can only proceed in certain directions consistent with that state. Legal
change is unlike biological evolution, however, in the sense that it is not driven by
random processes. Changes in law are always intentional,6 chosen by some human
agency. Theoretically, that should greatly increase the chances that change will be
adaptive, but it does not necessarily do so. Human choices about law are fallible,
often responsive to crisis rather than carefully thought out, and as likely to be
driven by interest group pressures as by the public interest. Perhaps legal changes
are more successful than random chance would suggest, but they are far less than
perfect. The selection pressures for law are not limited to economic efficiency or
the ability to achieve social goals. They include, and may even be dominated by,
responsiveness to powerful political interests.
Climate change is an especially difficult problem for property law to respond
to because it demands continual change rather than merely a single transition to a
new equilibrium. In a stable environment, fine-tuning to external circumstances is
the most adaptive strategy for law. In a rapidly changing environment like the one
we now face, however, that kind of fine-tuning can be disastrous. What is needed
in its stead is agility, the ability to adjust rapidly to changes as they occur. Yet
agility is one of the most difficult features for law, and especially property law, to
provide. Law by its very nature favors stability over time. Legal rules are supposed
to facilitate investment and allow people to make long-term decisions with
5. Ruhl, supra note 2, at 395–99.
6. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5
(2007); see also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
139, 148, 157 (2009) (comparing modern government-mediated changes in property law to intelligent
design).
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confidence. Property law, which supports long-term, capital-intensive investment,
is especially prone to strong entrenchment.7 As I explain below, the barriers to
developing sufficiently adaptable property law are high. If a transition to more
agile legal rules is possible at all, the efficiency of that transition, the opportunity
to compensate injured parties, and the probability of environmental protection are
all likely to be greater if it is planned and gradual rather than a sudden lurch in
response to a crisis. It makes sense, therefore, to think proactively about how the
necessary transition might be planned and carried out.
Although it has been suggested that markets may facilitate climate
adaptation, in my view, markets alone are not likely to do enough. Changes in law
will be necessary, and they will be difficult. Federal courts must play the keystone
role because they control the interpretation of key constitutional doctrines. They
also may be in the best position to do so because they are somewhat insulated
from direct political pressures. The chief legal impediment to climate adaptation at
the moment is federal court resistance to changes in property rules. If that
resistance can be softened, state courts and legislatures can, and likely will, make
needed adjustments. Federal courts should be careful not to stand in the way of
such adjustments, although they also have a role to play in ensuring that the costs
of change are fairly distributed.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS EVOLUTION
Some of the most fiercely contested questions about property rights relate to
change. The extent and rate at which property rules should change are highly
controversial. Just as controversial are who should bear the costs of change and
what institutions should have the power to determine and implement the
necessary changes.
Economists have long viewed property rights as the preferred tool for the
orderly allocation of scarce resources. They have developed a conventional, and
happy, tale explaining the development of individuated property rights as a matter
of seemingly inevitable evolutionary progress. Indeed, this process has come to be
described as “the evolution of property rights.”8
The conventional economic story of the evolution of property rights focuses
on the initial recognition of property rights in resources, describing that step as the
result of a crude sort of cost-benefit analysis.9 When the value of a resource
7. Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 2, at 50; Holly Doremus, Takings and
Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 21–24 (2003) [hereinafter Doremus, Takings and
Transitions].
8. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 163 (1975); Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S421 (2002) [hereinafter Levmore, Two Stories]; Gary D. Libecap & James L.
Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589,
S589 (2002).
9. Anderson & Hill, supra note 8, at 164–65.
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exceeds the costs of identifying and enforcing property rights, the story goes,
people get together and formally or informally create some kind of property right.
The call for recognition of property rights can result from crowding on the
commons, an increase in the value of an exploited resource, a decrease in the cost
of dividing the commons, or some combination of factors.10 The resulting
property rights may be formal legal rights, enforced by the state. Or, in a smaller,
homogenous group, they may be informal social norms, enforced by the social
community. The key is that a cost-benefit threshold is crossed: when the losses
due to externalities imposed by uncontrolled access exceed the costs of delineating
and enforcing individuated rights, those rights are invented. Property rights arise
when they are needed, and in the form needed.11 The invisible hand of economic
forces imposes selection pressure which guides the evolution of property rights,
through unspecified mechanisms.
Harold Demsetz was the first to articulate this evolutionary theory of
property,12 although he did not use that term. Over the years, others have refined
Demsetz’s story, pointing out the importance of interest group politics,13 and
more generally of political institutions and the rules through which decisions are
made.14 Still, the focus has remained primarily on the initial emergence and
subsequent strengthening of individuated property rights as a reaction to the
inefficiencies of collective ownership.15 The tacit assumption seems to be that
change should uniformly run in the direction of increased property rights, because
stronger property rights mean increased economic development and growth.16 In
10. Id. at 167 (“[A]nything which reduces the quantity of resources or lowers the opportunity
cost will shift the marginal cost curve. Changes in technology, changes in resource endowments, and
changes in the scale of operation all could cause such a shift.”); see also Levmore, Two Stories, supra note
8, at S423 (changes in technology or value can trigger changes in property rights); Svetozar Pejovich,
Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation of Property Rights, 30 REV. SOC. ECON. 309, 316 (1972) (“Some
important factors which govern changes in the content of property rights are asserted to be:
technological innovations and the opening of new markets, changes in relative factor scarcities, and
the behavior of the state.”); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991) (explaining that increasingly costly management strategies,
culminating in the creation of individual property rights, become appealing as congestion of the
resource increases); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 135–44 (2005) (describing the Demsetzian approach as focusing on
characteristics of the resource, including price, monitoring costs, and degree of utilization).
11. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 350; see also Anderson & Hill, supra note 8, at 172–76 (noting
development of cattle branding laws in the West but not in the East).
12. See generally Demsetz, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181,
183–84 (2003) [hereinafter Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path]; Levmore, Two Stories, supra note 8, at S422;
Libecap & Smith, supra note 8, at S597; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New
Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1869 (2000).
14. See generally Wyman, supra note 10.
15. See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 8; Gary D. Libecap, Economic Variables and the
Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 338 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 13, at 1871. Weakening of private property rights is understood
to happen, but is regarded as an aberration. Professor Levmore, for example, presents the reopening
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general, the economic story of property rights evolution continues to be presented
as a relentlessly positive one, in which property rights progress toward stronger
and more hard-edged individual property rights, which facilitate the efficient
distribution of resources. Even those who notice that the classic story hides
substantial opportunities for unhealthy political interest group maneuvering
nonetheless think that evolutionary pressures will keep property rights reasonably
close to the path of efficiency.17
The conventional Demsetzian story, however, is radically incomplete as a
description of property rights evolution. First, evolution does not necessarily
happen just because it would be desirable. The historical story, because it
inevitably sees the successes and does not see the failures, cannot help but
overestimate the probability of adaptive change. Imagine looking backward at the
process of biological evolution on earth, based only on species that currently exist.
Because every current species necessarily managed to evolve, it would look as if
evolution is always successful. But once you found fossilized remains of species
that had gone extinct, you would know that was too optimistic of a conclusion.18
Legal evolution, despite the fact that it is consciously directed by human
agency, should not be expected to be any more reliably successful. Changes in
property regimes create losers as well as winners. If the losers have sufficient
political power, change will not occur no matter how efficient it would be.19 Not
surprisingly, there are circumstances in which individual property rights have not
developed, or have substantially lagged the changes that made them necessary.20
Eventually, proponents of Demsetzian evolutionary theory tend to assume,
economic selection pressures will overcome even entrenched resistance.21 Perhaps
that will happen, but it is unlikely to happen quickly. Based on his study of the

of a commons as the product of abandonment or interest group politics. Levmore, Two Stories, supra
note 8, at S425–28. Although he concedes that “[w]e do not know that interest groups do more harm
than good,” Professor Levmore believes that at a minimum they raise suspicion. Id. at S428. In
fairness, I should note that Professor Levmore also recognizes that suspicious interest group activity
can be at the root of inefficient privatization. Id. at S429–31. He notes that any change in property
rights, strengthening or weakening, might arise either to maximize efficiency or as a result of interest
group maneuvering, and that “the emergence, as well as rearrangement [of property rights], is as
suspicious as their devolution.” Id. at S451.
17. Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 13, at 184.
18. According to some scientific estimates, no more than one to two percent of all the species
that have existed in the earth’s history remain in existence today. Douglas H. Erwin, Extinction as a
Loss of Evolutionary History, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11520, 11520 (2008).
19. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 8, at 168 (“Institutionally organized externalities do play
an important part in what actually happens to the property rights structure.”).
20. See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World
Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996 (2006) (describing the slow evolution of property rights
in third world countries); Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S610 (2002) (claiming that property rights never emerged for wild bison); Wyman, supra
note 10, at 190 (explaining the slow development of property rights in U.S. fisheries).
21. See, e.g., Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 13, at 184.
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history of patent law, John Duffy concludes, “Legal innovations take decades,
even centuries, to develop. Moreover, legal doctrines later seen to reflect deeply
flawed policy can remain stable law for large portions of a century before their
downfall.”22 Indeed, it may not happen at all. The evolution of law, like biological
evolution, is highly path dependent. New law is never written on a blank slate.
Existing rules and institutions necessarily constrain the forms that future rules and
institutions can take, and shape perceptions of whether change is needed and what
form change should take. As with biological evolution, the fact that legal evolution
may produce results, which are stable given the starting point and available path,
does not mean those results represent the best possible outcome.
The forces that prevent adaptive change need not be seen as evil.
Egalitarianism and widespread access to the political process are powerful
inhibitors of change. Because efficient rule changes are not always fair, evolution
of property rights toward efficiency may be slowest in the most egalitarian
societies.23 Where the victims of change do not have enough power to block it,
they also may not have the power to demand recompense. Some major property
transitions may have been feasible precisely because social stratification allowed
the elite winners to ignore costs to the downtrodden losers.24 It is not necessarily
bad if fairness concerns slow efficient changes in property rights. I mention the
possibility here simply to show that the evolution of property rights is hardly a
straight march to an objectively desirable “climax community.”25
Another problem with the conventional Demsetzian theory is that stronger
individual property rights are not necessarily either more efficient than collective
rights or more desirable in other ways. Private rights do not necessarily solve the
problem of overexploitation of the commons. Demsetz’s own primary illustration
of his thesis, recognition of family hunting grounds when the fur trade brought
increased demand for beaver pelts,26 provides an example. Privatization of hunting
grounds did not prevent beaver populations from falling sharply due to
overhunting following introduction of the fur trade.27 That might be because the

22. Duffy, supra note 6, at 4.
23. See Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 13, at 184.
24. Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S360–61
(2002).
25.
Ecologists once believed that ecosystems “evolved in a predetermined set of stages
(known as succession) toward a stable ‘climax community.’” Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty,
Complexity, and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 105, 140 (2006). For additional explanation of the concept of climax communities, see Judy L.
Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 876 (1994).
26. Demsetz, supra note 4, at 351–53.
27. See John C. McManus, An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American Fur
Trade, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 36, 39 (1972) (noting that beaver populations were depleted by overhunting
in Eastern Canada even though most of the indigenous bands in the region recognized “individual,
exclusive rights to take furs from well-defined hunting grounds”).
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private rights were incomplete,28 or because territory owners myopically
discounted the benefits of future hunting,29 or optimistically overestimated the
sustainable yield of beaver.30 The reasons are less important than the reality that
the introduction, or strengthening, of private property rights does not
automatically eliminate problems.
Indeed, imperfectly designed private rights can create their own pathologies.
The counterpart of the tragedy of the commons is the tragedy of the
anticommons, in which fragmented property rights create transaction costs that
block efficient resource use.31 Some kinds of property can realize their highest
value only through collective use.32 Furthermore, privatization will not align the
owner’s interests with society’s interest with respect to nonmarket resources
because owners cannot fully capture the benefits of those resources even with
strong property rights.33
Third, because property rights evolution must follow a prescribed
institutional path, institutional failures can stand in the way of adaptive change.
Evolution requires mechanisms that generate change. Without mutation and
selection, there could be no biological evolution. Without mechanisms for creating
new or modified types of property rights, there can be no evolution in that sphere.
Although there remain substantial difficulties in determining how property
institutions arise for the first time,34 once a stable government exists there are clear

28. McManus hypothesizes that they were subject to what he calls a “Good Samaritan”
exception—any member of the band could hunt on another’s territory if necessary for personal
consumption. The “owner” of the territory enjoyed only the exclusive right to take animals for sale.
Id. at 50–51.
29. On myopic discounting, see Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1295, 1320–21 (2009); R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV.
ECON. STUD. 165 (1956); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 262–65 (2000); Gordon C. Winston, The Reasons for Being of Two Minds: A
Comment on Schelling’s “Enforcing Rules on Oneself,” 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 375, 377–78 (1985) (noting that
people myopically discount future benefits).
30. Even with access to good scientific information, modern resource managers are prone to
allow excessive harvests. This phenomenon has been documented for U.S. fisheries, for example, in
Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question: Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing,
46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649, 671–72 (2003).
31. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
32. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986).
33. Biodiversity, for example, is a classic public good. In contrast to traditional goods, people
enjoy the benefits of biodiversity, which are primarily option value and existence value, in a
nonrivalrous way. “[T]he investor in [such public goods] will often have difficulty in appropriating the
returns that the investment generates for society as a whole.” Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of
the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 75–76 (2007).
34. Professor Krier has concisely explained the major strands of the debate about how
property rights initially arise, and offered an explanation that combines an initial self-interested search
for clear markers with a subsequent, more deliberate development of nuanced property institutions.
Krier, supra note 6, at 148–59.
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institutional mechanisms for refining, adding, or eliminating property rights.
Those institutions are crucial to whether evolution occurs and on what path.35
Fourth, evolution is not a unidirectional process. Yet in the literature on
property rights evolution there is little discussion of how or why changes that
weaken property rights might occur. That may be because the economists
primarily responsible for that literature are not interested in the relaxation of
property rights. Or, it might be because descriptively they believe change in the
direction of increasing private rights is more common.36 That would not be
unexpected. Cognitive framing suggests that there should be less political
resistance to changes that appear to strengthen rights than to those that appear to
weaken or remove rights, even those rights that no longer function efficiently.37
Of course, any creation of property rights from what had been an open
access commons in effect deprives commoners of something they previously had,
but it does so in favor of the focused interests who gain individual rights. If
adaptive change requires the loosening of existing property rights in favor of the
general public, it will face significant political barriers, no matter how efficient it
might be.38 If those changes do not generate direct market returns, it will be
difficult to compensate the losers. Those losers, as current property owners, are
not likely to be the relatively powerless whose claims can be ignored. Imposing
concentrated losses on the poor is unattractive;39 imposing concentrated losses on
the rich is likely to prove impossible. Once they emerge, therefore, property rights
are expected to be sticky.40 Even stickier, as environmental advocates have
learned, are attitudes that attend historic property rights and even property claims
that have never had the robust backing of law.41 People cling tenaciously to what
35. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 10, at 135 (arguing that prevalence of “veto points” in political
institutions governing U.S. fisheries has slowed the emergence of individual property rights).
36. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 24, at S361 (“Over the long run, transitions between property
regimes do generally seem to have run in the direction of efficiency.”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S653, S658 (2002) (“In most parts of the world, private ownership has generally grown in importance
relative to collective ownership.”).
37. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449,
492–501 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 13, at 190–92 (2003) (arguing that
interest groups will effectively defend property rights even if they cannot organize to grab new ones).
39. See Banner, supra note 24, at S368–69 (describing how British reorganization of property
rights in New Zealand took administrative shortcuts that caused the only significant asset of
thousands of Maori to suddenly vanish).
40. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 20, at 999 (explaining that under the Demsetzian theory, “the
likelihood of reversion to open or contested access will be relatively low because the benefits of
property are continuous, and other institutions emerge to protect its existence”). Fitzpatrick notes
that in the Third World, common property breakdowns are sometimes followed by reversion to open
access rather than progression to individual property. He attributes that reversion to a lack of social
order endemic to Third World societies. Id. at 999–1001; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The
Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S337 (2002).
41. See HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN:
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they believe are their entitlements.
Finally, there is one more important and asymmetric barrier to changes in
property rules: the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution (and its state
analogues). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Constitution requires
compensation not only when the government physically appropriates property,
but also when it changes the rules of property ownership too drastically or too
quickly. Compensation is required for permanent physical invasions of property,
no matter how minor.42 It is also categorically required for regulation that
eliminates all economically beneficial use of property, unless it simply makes
explicit pre-existing background property restrictions.43 If neither of these
categorical rules apply, the Court uses a generalized fairness test that looks
primarily to the economic impact of the regulation, especially the extent of
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action.44
Nominally, takings review does not impede legal change, but simply allocates
the costs of transitions between the government and property owners.45 In
practice, however,
[r]equiring compensation increases the barriers to change in two ways.
First, it superimposes a budgetary check on existing political hurdles.
Second, it suggests that property owners hold entitlements to act that
government should not infringe. By reframing the debate, judicial
declaration that compensation is required is likely to raise political, as well
as budgetary, barriers to regulation.46
As a practical matter, takings doctrine imposes a powerful check on changes
to property rules to the extent that those changes reduce individual property
entitlements. There can be no takings challenge to new rules that strengthen
property rights or create new ones where none previously existed. Regulatory

MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY AND DIRTY POLITICS 74–76 (2008) (describing the extent to
which irrigators in the Klamath Basin internalized the idea that they had strong rights to water despite
the weakness of their legal claims); Nash & Stern, supra note 37, at 458 (“In instances where property
attitudes prove costly, law has struggled to alter perceptions and change behavior.”). Nash and Stern
explain that new property rights can be made less sticky by publicly forewarning their holders of the
possibility of change. It is more difficult, however, to “reframe” views of longstanding property
rights. Id. at 458, 501.
42. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
43. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992).
44. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
45. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536–37 (“As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. In other
words, it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather
to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
46. Doremus, Takings and Transitions, supra note 7, at 11.
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takings doctrine therefore further skews the evolution of property rights in the
individualistic direction favored by Demsetzian economists.
III. CLIMATE DISRUPTION AS A CHALLENGE TO PROPERTY RIGHTS
Human activity has radically altered the global climate system over the last
two hundred years. Greenhouse gases resulting from the combustion of fossil
fuels have accumulated in the atmosphere at an accelerating rate; the atmospheric
concentration of CO2, the primary greenhouse gas, is now more than a third
higher than it was before the industrial revolution.47 Greenhouse gases trap energy
that would otherwise be radiated away from the earth, causing global mean
temperatures to rise.48 A variety of other effects follow from temperature change,
including sea level rise, glacial melting, changes in precipitation levels and storm
intensity, earlier snowmelt and associated runoff, and changes in the behavior and
ranges of plants and animals.49
The physical and biotic changes resulting from greenhouse gas accumulation
will disrupt the expectations of property owners in a variety of ways, undermining
the security of their investments and putting pressure on current definitions and
distributions of property rights. Two examples, vulnerable coastal lands and
freshwater, illustrate this phenomenon. Each is already the center of property
rights disputes; global climate change will inevitably heighten those tensions.
A. Coastal Lands
Sea level has been rising roughly two millimeters per year since 1950, and
more than three millimeters per year since 1990.50 Global sea level rise represents
the sum of two different processes. First, as air temperatures increase, so do water

47. Atmospheric CO2 has been continuously monitored at Mauna Loa, Hawaii, since 1958. In
that time, the mean CO2 concentration has increased from 315 to 390 ppm; currently, CO2 levels are
rising at about 2 ppm per year. Pieter Tans & Ralph Keeling, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., EARTH SYS. RES. LABORATORY, GLOBAL MONITORING
DIVISION, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/co2_data_mlo.html (last visited Aug. 18,
2011). The preindustrial (AD 1000–1750) atmosphere ranged from about 275 to 285 ppm CO2. P.
Forster et al., Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 137 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.
ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report_the_physical
_science_basis.htm.
48. Global mean temperature has increased roughly 0.8º C (roughly 1.4º F) since the industrial
revolution. GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, NASA GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE STUD., http://data
.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/graphs/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
49. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATE OF
KNOWLEDGE REPORT FROM THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 9 (Thomas R. Karl
et al. eds., 2009); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 8–12 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
50. Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-Level Rise and Its Impact on Coastal Zones, 328
SCIENCE 1517, 1517 (2010).
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temperatures. And as water warms, it expands. Second, rising temperatures mean
melting ice sheets. To the extent those ice sheets are land based and the melted
water runs off to the oceans, sea level will increase. The first phenomenon,
thermal expansion, is well understood, but the second one, glacial loss, is not.51
Overall, therefore, the “extent of future [sea level rise] remains highly uncertain.”52
Recent estimates of sea level rise by the end of this century range from as little as
ten centimeters to as much as 215 centimeters (roughly four inches to seven
feet).53
Perhaps surprisingly, sea level rise is not uniform across the globe. Absolute
sea level rise varies with local ocean temperatures, currents and winds, and other
local variables. Sea level rise relative to land also varies locally depending upon
whether the land is uplifting (from, for example, loss of the weight of glaciers as
they melt) or subsiding (for example, as a result of groundwater withdrawals).54
Small island states and the coasts of Africa and Asia are especially vulnerable to
sea level rise because their populations are heavily concentrated in coastal zones
and they lack the financial resources to adapt.55 But sea level rise will also affect
developed nations, including the United States.
Roughly one-third of Americans “live in counties immediately bordering the
nation’s ocean coasts.”56 Sea level rise is expected to be especially pronounced
along the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico.57 Major U.S. cities including New
York, Boston, Miami, and New Orleans are at high risk of inundation.58 Although
sea level rise on the Pacific coast is expected to be less extreme, heavily populated
areas around Puget Sound59 and San Francisco Bay60 are at significant risk. Sea

51.

Id. at 1518; GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49,

at 25.
52. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 50, at 1519.
53. Id. at 1518; Aslak Grinsted et al., Reconstructing Sea Level from Paleo and Projected Temperatures
200 to 2100 AD, 34 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 461, 469 (2010); Stefan Rahmstorf, A New View on Sea Level
Rise, 4 NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE 44, 45 (2010).
54. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 25–26;
Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 50, at 1518.
55. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 50, at 1519.
56. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 149.
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id. at 103, 109, 150.
59. Id. at 138. In southern Florida, sea level rise of twenty-seven inches, well within the range
of forecasts for the next century, would inundate a large proportion of southern Florida; more than
1.5 million people currently make their home in parts of the state which would be underwater.
ELIZABETH STANTON & FRANK ACKERMAN, TUFTS UNIV., FLORIDA AND CLIMATE CHANGE, at v
(2007), available at http://www.ase.tufts. edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Florida_hr.pdf.
60. See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY
68 (2009); MATTHEW HEBERGER ET AL., CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER, THE IMPACTS
OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE CALIFORNIA COAST 13 (2009), available at http://www.pacinst.org/
reports/sea_level_rise/report.pdf; Tim Eichenberg et al., Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Using an Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL.
L.J. 243, 245–46 (2010).
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level rise can flood coastal communities, cause saltwater to contaminate surface or
groundwater resources, interfere with the functioning of septic systems,61 and
drown coastal wetlands.62 It can break barrier islands in pieces or cause them to
move rapidly shoreward.63 It increases coastal erosion and damage from storm
surges.64 Synergistically, warmer ocean waters are likely to increase the intensity of
hurricanes and tropical storms, making them even more damaging.65 Homes,
roads, rail lines, power lines, pipelines, and other built infrastructure are all at risk,
as are coastal ecosystems.66
B. Fresh Water
The problem of adaptation to climate change is in many ways a water
problem, and one that will hit regions already at or near the limits of their water
resources, such as the American West, especially hard. Global warming will alter
many factors that are important to water management and use. Most obviously,
warmer air temperatures mean warmer water temperatures. That may not be much
of a problem for most human water users, but it can be a matter of life or death
for cold-water fishes such as salmonids.67
The effects of climate change on water go far beyond direct changes in
temperature, however. Higher atmospheric temperatures mean that a higher
proportion of precipitation will fall as rain, rather than snow.68 The shift from
snow to rain will be especially pronounced in areas like California’s Sierra Nevada
mountains, where current winter temperatures commonly hover near the freezing

61. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A
FOCUS ON THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION 174 (2009).
62. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 62, 114;
Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 50, at 1518.
63. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 61, at 22.
64. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 10. One
report from a decade ago estimates that 1,500 shoreline homes are lost to erosion each year, at a total
cost to landowners of about $530 million. THE HEINZ CTR., REPORT BRIEF: EVALUATION OF
EROSION HAZARDS 2 (2000).
65. It is still difficult to predict whether global warming will increase the number of storm
events globally or in particular regions, but most observers think it will increase storm intensity.
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 35–36; Thomas R.
Knutson et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 157, 161 (2010).
66. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 57, 62,
84.
67. See, e.g., M.D. Bryant, Global Climate Change and Potential Effects on Pacific Salmonids in
Freshwater Ecosystems of Southeast Alaska, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 169 (2009); B. Jonsson & N. Jonsson,
A Review of the Likely Effects of Climate Change on Anadromous Atlantic Salmon Salmo Salar and Brown Trout
Salmo Trutta, with Particular Reference to Water Temperature and Flow, 75 J. FISH BIO. 2381 (2009); Dale A.
McCullough et al., Research in Thermal Biology: Burning Questions for Coldwater Stream Fishes, 17 REV. IN
FISHERIES SCI. 90 (2009).
68. LEVI D. BREKKE ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCULAR NO. 1331, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2009).
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point and local warming is expected to exceed the global average.69 The fraction
of winter precipitation falling as snow has decreased significantly since the midtwentieth century across much of the western United States;70 that trend is
expected to accelerate. As a result, the winter snowpack, which serves as an
important natural reservoir, is forecast to decrease dramatically, losing as much as
ninety percent of its present storage capacity by 2100 in some places.71 Together,
the shift from winter snow to rain and warmer spring temperatures will push peak
flows and spring runoff earlier in the year. Because, especially in the West, “water
management strategies for supply and flood control are . . . highly attuned to
streamflow timing,” such changes will be problematic for both water
management72 and aquatic ecosystems.
Climate change will also alter the total amount of precipitation. In general,
the northern and eastern portions of the country are expected to get wetter, while
the already arid Southwest gets drier.73 Uncertainty about precipitation changes
remains high,74 especially at the regional scale. It is still difficult to forecast the
direction or magnitude of precipitation changes at temporal and geographic scales
relevant to water management.75 On a worldwide basis, however, scientists have
high confidence that climate change will substantially alter hydrology. A
committee of the National Research Council recently offered quantitative
estimates: for every one degree Celsius increase in global mean temperature, we
should expect five to ten percent changes in precipitation and streamflow in many
areas.76
69. MICHAEL KIPARSKY & PETER H. GLEICK, PAC. INST. FOR STUDIES IN DEV., ENV’T, &
SEC., CLIMATE CHANGE AND CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES 6 (2003), available at
http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/cwpu2005/vol4/vol4-globalclimate-climatechangeand
californiawater.pdf.
70. Noah Knowles et al., Trends in Snowfall Versus Rainfall in the Western United States, 19 J.
CLIMATE 4545, 4557 (2006).
71. MICHAEL ANDERSON, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., THE STATE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE FOR WATER RESOURCES OPERATIONS, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT 1 (2009), available
at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/cwpu2009/0310final/v4c02a16_cwp2009.pdf. The
spring snowpack in the Sierra Nevada has already lost about ten percent of its historic volume. CAL.
DEP’T OF WATER RES., MANAGING AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WATER 3 (2008), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/climate
change/docs/ClimateChangeWhitePaper.pdf.
72. BARRY NELSON ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, IN HOT WATER: WATER
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO WEATHER THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 6 (2007), available
at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/hotwater/hotwater.pdf.
73. TETRA TECH, INC., EVALUATING SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECTED WATER DEMANDS
UNDER FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS 14 (2010), available at http://rd.tetratech.com
/climatechange/projects/doc/Tetra_Tech_Climate_Report_2010_lowres.pdf; BREKKE ET AL., supra
note 68, at 6–7.
74. Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Change Predictions, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra
note 47, at 768.
75. ANDERSON, supra note 71, at 1; Julia M. Slingo et al., Introduction: Food Crops in a Changing
Climate, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. B 1983, 1985 (2005).
76. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON STABILIZATION TARGETS FOR
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In addition to changing average precipitation levels, climate change is
expected to increase precipitation variability. Both drought and flood will become
more common. “Normal” water years may become the exception, rather than the
rule. Precipitation is likely to come in more intense events, even in areas where
total rainfall goes down.77
C. The Property Rights Challenge
The examples of coastal lands and fresh waters illustrate the extent to which
climate change is a legal as well as practical problem. It is a legal problem because
law inhibits society’s ability to respond to the changes climate disruption brings. In
each context, individuated property rights butt up against common rights that
cannot be effectively privatized. In each, adapting to climate change will be more
difficult, and will reach a different endpoint, if current property holders enjoy rigid
rights which cannot be adjusted without consent or compensation. In each
context, even without climate change, the extent of those individuated rights is
already contested and property law, which strives for stability, struggles to cope
with what are already dynamic systems. Climate change further emphasizes the
dynamic nature of land and water, raises the economic and emotional stakes, and
increases the likelihood of conflict.
1. Coastal Lands
With respect to coastal lands, conflict centers on the rights to build
structures and to armor the coast in order to protect those structures. Their
proximity to the ocean makes coastal lands both especially attractive for residential
construction78 and especially vulnerable to storms and erosion.79 The aesthetic
attractions of coastal property seem to carry more weight in the marketplace than
its vulnerability. The value of coastal lands has risen dramatically.80
ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS:
EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENIA 6 (prepublication
copy, 2010).
77. Meehl et al., supra note 74, at 750.
78. In general, home value substantially increases with water frontage, and decreases with
distance from the water. See, e.g., George R. Parsons & Michael Powell, Measuring the Cost of Beach
Retreat, 29 COASTAL MGMT. 91, 98 (2001) and references cited therein; see also Oliver A. Houck, More
Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 358 (2004)
(“Oceanfront property, raw land, and sand, sells for up to half a million dollars an acre, and highly
desirable property even more.”).
79. See, e.g., Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss,
and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 539 (2007) (describing the
vulnerability of California’s coastal bluffs); Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries, and SOBs, 25 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 24–25 (2009) (noting that beaches are generally dynamic systems).
80. Dana Beach & Kim Diana Connolly, A Retrospective on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: Public Policy Implications for the 21st Century, 12 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2003)
(noting dramatic price increases “on an especially unstable part of the Isle of Palms” in South
Carolina just prior to David Lucas’s purchase of his lots). In Florida, the total value of coastal parcels,
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Coastal development affects both public and private interests. Coastal lands
lie at the intersection of public and private lands; in most coastal states, the state
owns lands below the mean high-water mark, or at least the public holds an
easement to access those lands for purposes of navigation, fishing, and
recreation.81 Private landowners who have developed coastal lands often want to
“armor” their shoreline with seawalls and similar structures to halt erosion before
it threatens their structures.82 But such armoring can destroy the public beach
seaward of the wall83 and block access to the remaining public beach.84 Armoring
can also cause erosion on adjacent lands, which may be privately owned.85
There has already been considerable controversy and litigation over
government-imposed restrictions on rights to build on and armor privately owned
coastal lands. Coastal development restrictions produced one of the iconic
Supreme Court takings decisions of the late twentieth century, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.86 Lucas grew out of a challenge to South Carolina’s
Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited building on two lots owned by
David Lucas, which lay seaward of the historic erosion line established by the
state. Finding that Lucas had been deprived of all economic use of his property,
the Court concluded that he was entitled to compensation unless “the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with”87 based on background
principles of state law.88 Although the Beachfront Management Act was supported
by legislative findings that development too close to the beach “accelerated
erosion, and endangered adjacent property,”89 on remand the South Carolina
Supreme Court found no common law basis for the state to bar Lucas from
building on his lot.90
defined as those seaward of the road closest to the shore, was $181 billion in 2007, more than double
what it was in 2002. JUDITH KILDOW, NAT’L OCEAN ECON. PROGRAM, PHASE II: FLORIDA’S
OCEAN AND COASTAL ECONOMIES REPORT 83–88 (2008), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us
/oceanscouncil/reports/Florida_Phase_II_Report.pdf.
81. Eichenberg et al., supra note 60, at 247–50.
82. See, e.g., Niki L. Pace, Wetlands or Seawalls? Adapting Shoreline Regulation to Address Sea Level
Rise and Wetland Preservation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 327, 328–29 (2011).
83. Caldwell & Segall, supra note 79, at 540; Madeline Reed, Seawalls and the Public Trust:
Navigating the Tension Between Private Property and Public Beach Use in the Face of Shoreline Erosion, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 307–10 (2009).
84. Caldwell & Segall, supra note 79, at 540.
85. Omar Defeo et al., Threats to Sandy Beach Ecosystems: A Review, 81 ESTUARINE COASTAL &
SHELF SCI. 1, 6 (2009).
86. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
87. Id. at 1027.
88. Id. at 1029.
89. Id. at 1021 n.10.
90. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). Blake Hudson has suggested
that the state Coastal Council argued its case badly on remand, failing to present what might have
been a persuasive argument that the venerable public trust doctrine supported the coastal building
prohibition. Blake Hudson, The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines and the Untold Story of the Lucas Remand,
34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 130–35 (2009).
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Conflicts about the right of property owners to armor their coastal property
and the legal effect of armoring have also reached the courts. Several states have
barred or substantially restricted coastal armoring.91 Courts in Oregon and North
Carolina have upheld armoring prohibitions against takings challenges.92 But such
restrictions remain controversial, legally contested, and in tension with federal
incentives and a general bias toward “hard solutions”93 to coastal vulnerability.
There is some venerable authority for the proposition that coastal landowners
have a right to erect structures to defend their property from the inroads of the
sea;94 according to Peter Byrne, in the most prominent modern cases rejecting
such a right state courts “have had to resort to creative interpretations” of
precedent.95 Professor Joseph Sax has suggested that neither traditional common
law rules nor the Takings Clause offer a helpful way of conceptualizing modern
conflicts over armoring to protect lands from rapid sea level rise driven by global
warming.96 Yet they continue to be fought on precisely that legal landscape.
As with rights to armor, the legal effect of migration of the shoreline, with or
without armoring, has spawned conflict. In the absence of armoring, the mean
high water mark, vegetation, or whatever line of demarcation the states regard as
separating public and private rights, can move both coastward and seaward as
sand accumulates (accretes) and erodes away. Under this “rolling easement” or
ambulatory public trust approach, as erosion moves the coast back the public trust
easement accompanies it, so that public rights neither increase nor decrease.97
Texas recognizes what may be the most extreme version of this doctrine. There,

91. Caldwell & Segall, supra note 79, at 572–74; Eichenberg et al., supra note 60, at 271.
92. Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217 (1999); Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court declined to take up the Oregon case,
with Justices Scalia and O’Connor expressing some skepticism about the validity of the state court’s
determination that an established “background principle” of state law, the public’s customary use to
utilize the dry-sand beach for recreation, justified denial of a permit to build a seawall on the dry sand.
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994).
93. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 61, at 165 (Federal, state, local, and
private institutions generally have a strong bias favoring shore protection over retreat in developed
areas.); id. at 169 (noting that there are clear institutional paths for federal permits for armoring, while
more environmentally sensitive “soft” solutions must be sought individually).
94. See Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 59 P.2d 473, 477–78 (Cal. 1936); Revell v. People, 52
N.E. 1052, 1059–60 (Ill. 1898).
95. J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory Takings
Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 638 (2010).
96. Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, Beach Erosion, and Property
Rights, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641 (2010).
97. See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 110–11 (Tex. App. 1986); Matcha v. Mattox, 711
S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. 1986) (“An easement fixed in place while the beach moves would result in
the easement being either under water or left high and dry inland, detached from the shore. Such
easement, meant to preserve the public right to use and enjoy the beach, would then cease
functioning for that purpose.”). For a general description of the rolling easement concept, see James
G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without
Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1313–17 (1998).
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the state claims a public easement on the dry sand beach of its Gulf Coast up to
the vegetation line under the common law and the Texas Open Beaches Act.98
When hurricanes erode the beach, that line can move landward to the extent that
shorefront homes are suddenly located on the state’s dry sand, at which point the
state may demand their removal from the public easement.99 Texas’s intermediate
courts of appeals have upheld this application of a rolling easement against a series
of takings challenges,100 but the issue remains unsettled in the Texas Supreme
Court and the federal courts.101
Recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the boundary between private and
public rights may continue to move even if a seawall halts the encroachment of
the tidelands. In United States v. Milner,102 it held that an upland landowner could
not “permanently fix the property boundary” with a seawall absent consent of the
tidelands owner. Affirming a district court finding that the seawall was now
trespassing on the tidelands, the circuit court wrote, “Once the shore has eroded
so dramatically that the property owner’s shore defense structures fix the
ambulatory boundary, the upland owner cannot expect to permanently maintain
the boundary there without paying damages to the tideland owner or working out
an agreement with the tideland owner.”103 Because the Milner case arose in the
unusual context of an Indian reservation, with the federal government rather than

98. The Open Beaches Act was first passed in 1959. David J. Bederman, The Curious
Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1414 (1996). The
precise relationship between the Act and common law public easements by custom or prescription is
not entirely clear, but that is not unusual. Statutes and the common law are often intricately
intermingled in the creation and definition of property rights. Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution
and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379 (2001).
99. See Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2009).
100. See Brannan v. State, No. 01-08-00179-CV, 2010 WL 375921, at *20 (Tex. App. Feb. 4,
2010).
101. Severance, 566 F.3d at 498–500. In Severance, the Fifth Circuit found a federal takings claim
unripe because the plaintiff had not sought compensation in state courts, and it was not certain that
such a claim would fail. Id. at 500. The court concluded, that a related “unreasonable seizure” claim
under the Fourth Amendment might be ripe, but that like a takings claim that argument could not be
resolved without clearer understanding of the relevant state law. It therefore certified to the Supreme
Court of Texas several questions about whether Texas in fact recognizes rolling easements, the legal
basis for those easements, and the extent to which the prior owners of property that becomes subject
to such an easement would be entitled to compensation. Id. at 503–04. A strong dissent would have
found that, because any taking or unreasonable seizure had occurred long before plaintiff Severance
purchased the property and she had full notice of it at the time of her acquisition, she had no grounds
for complaint. Id. at 504–15 (Wiener, J., dissenting). In response to the certified questions, the Texas
Supreme Court initially answered that the public trust easement moves automatically with gradual
erosion but not with avulsive storm events. Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2010), reh’g
abated, No. 09-0387, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 573 (S.W.3d, July 29, 2011), reh’g reinstated, No. 09-0387, 2011
Tex. LEXIS 779 (S.W.3d, Oct. 7, 2011).
102. 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009).
103. Id. at 1190. The court further held that the United States has a right under the Rivers and
Harbors Act to demand removal of seawalls which come, because of the movement of the tidal
boundary, to be located in navigable waters. Id. at 1191–94.

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

3/28/2012 1:35 PM

1109

the state owning the tidelands and holding them in trust for the tribe, the court
acknowledged that its decision might have limited application.104 Its reasoning,
however, would appear to apply in any state that has recognized an ambulatory
boundary between private and public lands and rejected application of the
common enemy doctrine to the waters of the sea.105
Finally, coastal land property rights illustrate the tension between flexibility
and stability in property law. The coasts have always been dynamic; shorelines
have moved landward and seaward with storms and sediment deposits. In order to
deal with that dynamism, the common law long ago developed doctrines to
readjust property rights as the physical reality shifted. Although the reasoning
behind the doctrines may have been lost or misconstrued over time and
application of the rule has shifted over time,106 the principle is well established at
common law that if the shore moves gradually (by erosion or accretion) the title
boundary moves with it, but if it moves rapidly (by avulsion) title does not shift.107
The accretion/avulsion rules are dynamic in the sense that they allow
property boundaries to change under certain circumstances according to a set of
principles that are easy to state but more challenging to apply. There is
considerable resistance within the judiciary, however, to another kind of shift:
changes in the principles that govern property. In Lucas, Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, explained that restrictions so severe as to deny all economically
beneficial use of property “cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place
upon land.”108 As Professor Sax noted shortly after the decision, Scalia’s opinion
“seems deliberately calculated to cut off arguments that changing times create
changing needs, and with them changing (diminished) expectations that property
owners must internalize. Indeed the question, how responsive must property
owners be to changing public goals and values, is the central point of dispute
between the majority and the dissent in Lucas.”109
At the time, most observers focused on Justice Scalia’s transparent hostility
to legislative redefinition of property rights. In the Supreme Court’s most recent
takings decision, however, Justice Scalia made clear that he is just as skeptical of
judicial revision of property law, at least to revision in the direction of limiting

104. Id. at 1190 n.11.
105. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Sharp v. United
States, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3273 (2010).
106. For a thorough and careful explication of the development of the doctrines of accretion
and avulsion in English law, see Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future
Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 311–43 (2009).
107. Id. at 306; Christie, supra note 79, at 26–27.
108. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
109. Joseph L. Sax, Rights that “Inhere in the Title Itself”: The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western
Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 945 (1993).
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individual rights. In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection,110 the Court took up a claim that Florida’s Supreme Court had
unconstitutionally taken private property without compensation when it upheld a
state beach restoration program under which sand is added on the state’s
submerged lands, extending the beach seaward, and the boundary between private
and state property is fixed at the mean high-water line before the
renourishment.111 Plaintiff, a nonprofit composed of owners of beachfront
property in a renourishment project area, objected that the project eliminated their
property rights to have accretions add to their property and to have their property
touch the water. The Florida high court rejected those claims, ruling that Florida
law did not give coastal property owners a vested right either to accretion or to
contact with the sea. Plaintiff then sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court,
asserting that the Florida decision had worked a judicial taking. The Court
unanimously rejected that claim in this case, but in a plurality opinion that
garnered four votes, Justice Scalia wrote that state courts are subject to the same
prohibition on takings as legislatures.112 He went so far as to deny Justice
Kennedy’s assertion that “[s]tate courts generally operate under a common-law
tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law.”113 As John
Echeverria has pointed out, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment
could be read to announce the sweeping rule (albeit not yet a majority rule) that
“every judicial change in the legal status quo is a taking.”114 Justice Scalia does not
view that prospect with alarm. He thinks that “courts have no peculiar need of
flexibility;” rather than change property law, they should do no more than “clarify
and elaborate property entitlements.”115
As it currently stands, the law that applies to coastal properties is hardly
clear, but does stand in the way of efficient and effective response to the problem
of rising seas. Lucas makes it difficult to prohibit building on coastal lots without
paying compensation, even where the evidence establishes that development will
accelerate erosion of the public beach or nearby private property. The law does
seem to permit at least some restrictions on armoring, but there is considerable
confusion about the limits on such restrictions and their effect on property
boundaries, which would otherwise be ambulatory.
110. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
111. Id. at 2599–600. The details of Florida’s beach renourishment program, implemented
under its Beach and Shore Preservation Act, are explained in Christie, supra note 79, at 39–43.
112. Id. at 2602 (“If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of
private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically
appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation.”).
113. Justice Kennedy’s assertion appears at id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia’s sharp rejoinder, which characterizes Justice Kennedy’s statement as “astounding,” is at id. at
2606.
114. John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is Different, 35 VT. L.
REV. 475, 477 (2010).
115. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609.
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2. Fresh Water
With respect to fresh water, property rights conflicts have focused on the
balance between rights to divert water for use and obligations to leave water in
streams to maintain aquatic ecosystems. Like the coastal lands disputes, the water
conflicts have not coalesced around a common understanding of the relevant
principles.
In contrast to the coastal lands context, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
recently weighed in on conflicts over property rights in water. In two important
cases, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States,116 and Casitas Municipal
Water District v. United States,117 the Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit have
struggled to define the relevant principles.
In the western United States, where the doctrine of prior appropriation
replaced English riparianism in the nineteenth century, water is the subject of a
complex set of property rules. The state holds title to water,118 but usufructuary
rights can be obtained by diverting water from streams and putting it to beneficial
use. In theory, prior appropriation applies a rigid form of the familiar property
allocation rule of “first in time, first in right.”
Under the law of prior appropriation, water rights are allocated to the
first person to put a specific quantity of water to beneficial use. The user
obtains a temporal priority, and in times of scarcity, the right to withdraw
or pump water is curtailed in reverse order of the manifestation of an
intent to appropriate. The most junior user . . . must yield to the more
senior and so on along a stream system . . . .119
In practice, strict enforcement of priority rights is the exception rather than
the rule.120 Nonetheless, courts are reluctant to tamper openly with the priority
system.121
Prior appropriation, like other “first in time” rules, sets up a race to capture
the resource. Capture rules tend to result in inefficient overexploitation and
excessively rapid development of the resource.122 As economists would have

116. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
117. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118. Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 218 (2007).
119. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 882
(2000).
120. Id. at 883 (Priority “is often more rhetoric than rule”; its importance “lies more in the
threat of its application rather than the application.”).
121. See id. at 908–09 (describing California Supreme Court opinion overturning a lower
court’s imposition of an equitable apportionment solution on groundwater claimants).
122. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapena, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 23–24 (2002) (describing the
effects of the rule of capture as applied in western prior appropriation law); Jason Scott Johnston, The
Rule of Capture and the Economic Dynamics of Natural Resource Use and Survival Under Open Access Management
Regimes, 35 ENVTL. L. 855, 858–60 (2005) (describing capture rules as generally creating incentives for
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predicted, the West’s waters were quickly appropriated, and overappropriated.123
The rush for surface waters has created another legacy problem. Once
gained, appropriative water rights persist forever so long as water continues to be
put to beneficial use.124 That means that early appropriators retain the most senior
rights, even as societal goals and the relative value of their use change.125 As
Robert Adler puts it, “[A] system in which the winners are defined entirely by who
got there first may become increasingly irrational.”126 The holders of the most
senior rights are typically irrigators,127 and not necessarily those with the best lands
or the highest-value crops. Most of the water used for agricultural purposes goes
to low-value crops like alfalfa, pasture forage, and cotton. This allocation is
economically irrational by any measure.128
an inefficient rush to develop).
123. See, e.g., WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM’N, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 6-1 (1998), available at http://wwa.colorado.edu/western_
water_law/docs/WaterintheWest_WPPRAC.pdf (“The West’s waters are overappropriated in many
places.”); Reed D. Benson, Rivers to Live By: Can Western Water Law Help Communities Embrace Their
Streams?, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 6 n.24 (2007) (“Overappropriation is quite common
in western river systems.”); Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of the
Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 437 (2004) (noting that in Oregon, many streams became
overappropriated with nineteenth-century settlement, and today “[a]n imbalance between paper water
rights and wet water means that many streams are dry in the summer and some water rights go
unsatisfied, even though they may have priority dates reaching back into the 1800s”); Jason S. Wells,
Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Protection: The Opportunities and Impediments to Improved Public Interest
Involvement in Colorado’s Instream Flow Protection Regime, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 309, 350 (2004)
(“There are few areas in Colorado, if any, where more water flows than has been claimed for
consumptive uses; almost every stream in the state is overappropriated.”).
124. Benson, supra note 123, at 6.
125. Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV.
403, 413 (2009) (“[M]any senior water rights have been locked into relatively inefficient, traditional
uses—agricultural flood irrigation, for example— even as cities are scrambling to find future water
supplies.”).
126. Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 24 (2010).
127. Agriculture, which was established across the West before cities grew up, remains
responsible for the vast majority of western water use. In California, for example, although the precise
ratio varies from year to year, agriculture generally consumes about four times as much water as urban
uses. See 1 CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005: A FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION 3–9 (2005), available at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov /previous/cwpu2005
/index.cfm.
128. An acre-foot of water in the hands of a semiconductor manufacturer can generate nearly
a million dollars in revenue, while the same acre-foot in the hands of an alfalfa farmer would produce
only about sixty dollars. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1873, 1887 (2005). In a more typical setting, prices for market transfers that have occurred reveal that
the marginal value of water in municipal or industrial use is three to four times its value in agricultural
use. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 723, 724 – 25 (2009). That differential appears to be increasing. Id. at 725.
Yet low-value agriculture continues to hold the bulk of the water rights. Such inefficiencies persist in
part because the barriers to water rights marketability are formidable. See, e.g., id. at 730–37 (describing
transaction costs introduced by institutional structures of western irrigation and state statutory
provisions); Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Management in the

Assembled V1I4 3.28.2012 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

3/28/2012 1:35 PM

1113

Frozen in the past as it is, the allocation of water rights under prior
appropriation fails to account for modern views of the value of environmental
protection. Environmental values were scarcely in the picture when the West’s
waters were being divided, and their protection is fundamentally at variance with
the rule that diversion is required to gain rights. As competition for limited waters
has intensified and environmental protection obligations have become more
stringent, conflicts over rights to divert at the cost of aquatic ecosystems have
become more frequent and more intense.
Until recently, how the Takings Clause would be applied to restrictions on
the exercise of appropriative water rights was a theoretical and speculative
question. On one hand, water rights have always been formally more tenuous than
land rights. “[P]roperty rights in water are not only restrictively defined, but the
definitions openly anticipate changes that may diminish or abolish uses that were
once permitted.”129 The understanding of beneficial uses might narrow over time,
or the definition of public trust interests expand.130 On the other hand, “[t]he
appropriation doctrine has long emphasized security of water rights to encourage
investment in water development projects.”131
In 2001, the Court of Claims brought the water takings issue out of the
hypothetical world into the real one. In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v.
United States, it held that the United States had taken the property of water users
when it imposed restrictions on deliveries from state and federal water projects to
protect endangered fish.132 Two conclusions about the nature of water takings
analysis were crucial to the result: first, the court decided that limits on diversions
should be considered physical takings of water rights, meaning that they would
categorically require compensation;133 second, although it granted that California
had the power to modify plaintiffs’ water rights “at any time . . . to reflect the
changing need of the various water users,” it refused to anticipate those revisions
before the state formally made them.134
The G.W. Bush administration did not appeal Tulare Lake.135 Critics of the

American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 63–66 (2008); Robert Glennon & Michael J.
Pearce, Transferring Mainstem Colorado River Water Rights: The Arizona Experience, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
236 (2007); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
445, 471 (2008) (“[T]he interconnectedness of uses makes modularization of the water rights very
difficult. And the low level of modularization of rights makes them less easily transferable.”).
129. Sax, supra note 109, at 951.
130. Id. at 951–54.
131. Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the
Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 461 (1995).
132. The court subsequently awarded plaintiffs nearly $14 million in damages, plus interest. 59
Fed. Cl. 246, 247 (2003).
133. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
134. Id. at 324.
135. John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579,
581 (2010).
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decision contended that it was “unlikely to be of further significance.”136 That
intuition seemed to be confirmed a few years later, when the judge who had
decided Tulare Lake reversed course in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United
States, holding that the nuanced balancing test for regulatory takings, rather than
the categorical physical takings rules, should be applied.137 But the Federal Circuit
reversed138 in a decision that leaves considerable uncertainty about the test for
takings in the context of water rights.
Casitas, like Tulare Lake, arose out of a conflict between irrigation and
conservation of endangered fish in the operations of a federal water project. In the
Federal Circuit,139 it focused on a requirement that the water district construct a
fish ladder and divert some of the water it took from the Ventura Project to that
ladder to facilitate fish passage, rather than on limits on the district’s right to
remove water from the stream.140 The Court of Claims ruled that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, issued after Tulare Lake, precluded application of the physical takings
framework.141 The Federal Circuit, over a dissent, disagreed. It held that the
categorical physical takings test supplied the appropriate analytical framework
because the government had “not merely require[d] some water to remain in the
stream, but instead actively caused the physical diversion of water away from [the
district’s diversion canal] and towards the fish ladder, thus reducing [the district’s]
water supply.”142
The Federal Circuit’s Casitas decision leaves many questions unanswered.
First, given the court’s focus on the fish ladder, it did not decide the Tulare Lake
issue—whether a restriction on diversions would be analyzed as a physical taking.
The court’s justification for the decision, emphasizing the government’s physical
appropriation of the water by compelling its rerouting, suggests that limits on
diversion would not fall in the same category. Second, given the procedural
posture of the case, the court did not address the scope of the district’s property
rights. The United States had sought summary judgment on the question of the
appropriate takings standard. For purposes of that motion, it conceded that the
district held the rights it claimed to divert water and put it to beneficial use. On
remand, however, it remains open to the United States to argue that the public
trust doctrine (or other background principles of state law) limits the district’s
property rights. Finally, it is far from clear that the Supreme Court would agree
136. Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth
Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 586 (2002).
137. 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007).
138. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
139. See Echeverria, supra note 135, at 589–90 (describing the shift in emphasis from the trial
court to the court of appeals).
140. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1282.
141. Casitas, 76 Fed. Cl. at 106.
142. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1291–92.
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with the Federal Circuit that the physical takings framework applies. The United
States did not seek certiorari following the ruling,143 but will have another
opportunity to do so should it lose on remand.
Like the law of coastal property rights, the law of water rights remains
uncertain, in much the same way and for much the same reasons. At the coast and
in western waters, public and private rights butt up against one another,
sometimes overlap, and more and more often find themselves in tension.
Identifying clear boundaries between the two and deciding which prevails in a
conflict are tasks which have become more difficult over the last fifty years as
notions of the nature of the public interests at stake have expanded to include
environmental protection.
IV. CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ADJUSTMENT
Environmentalists have long argued that property law should be revised to
reduce the barriers it poses to environmental protection.144 They have yet to make
much progress, however. Environmental regulation has tinkered with property law
at the margins, but has not produced a wholesale readjustment of property rights.
Climate adaptation requires more tinkering with property rights, but not
necessarily wholesale rethinking. What is chiefly needed is greater openness to
change and greater deference to public, as opposed to private, property rights.
Although the required changes are not dramatic, they will not be easy. Federal
courts will have to play the primary role, and persuading them to do so in an era
when “activist” is the worst epithet that can be attached to a judge will surely be a
challenge.
A. Evolution Must Be Rapid
Climate disruption makes changes in property rights more urgent, but not
necessarily more likely. Crisis can lower political barriers to legal change; indeed, a
substantial proportion of U.S. environmental legislation can be traced to reactions
to high-profile crisis events.145
143. Echeverria, supra note 135, at 581. The government did seek rehearing and rehearing en
banc by the Federal Circuit, unsuccessfully. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 556 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
144. See, e.g., ERIC FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS (1998); ERIC
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE (2003); Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water’s Edge: Limits to
“Ownership” of Aquatic Systems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 201
(Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005); Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of
Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002); Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving
the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773 (2002); Robert J. Goldstein,
Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology Into Real Property Law, 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998); Joseph H. Guth, Law for the Ecological Age, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 431
(2008); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2008).
145. See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33
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There are several reasons, however, not to wait for climate disruption to
reach the point of crisis before thinking through, and beginning to make, needed
changes to property rules. First, climate change is not the kind of immediate crisis
that breaks political logjams; it is more like the gradual heating of the pot that
seems easy for people (if not frogs)146 to ignore.147 By the time the effects of
climate disruption become sufficiently catastrophic to grab political attention, the
world will be committed to far worse.148 Second, climate adaptation is not a rapid
endeavor. It may require construction of new infrastructure or even movement of
populations away from high-risk areas. Those kinds of steps cannot be taken
overnight. Third, climate adaptation will require careful reflection and planning,149
yet the response to crisis is not always (or even often) rational, carefully
considered, or well adapted to future conditions. In particular, a crisis affecting
human health, or even human economic well-being, can override any concern

ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 409 (2006) (“Urgency, the sense that environmental problems pose threats
requiring a strong collective response, has been environmentalism’s motive force. This sense animated
Congress’ enactment of the federal environmental laws of the 1970s and ‘80s, which restructured
institutional arrangements to address a range of perceived environmental crises.”); Robert V. Percival,
Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 173–74 (1997)
(“The history of environmental law seems to suggest that Congress and the EPA respond to
perceived crises that demand public attention: for example, CERCLA was enacted in response to
Love Canal and other incidents generating widespread public concern over uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites; the origins of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act can be traced
to the Bhopal tragedy; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill broke more than a decade of legislative gridlock
and produced the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.”); Michael Allan Wolf, Environmental Law Slogans for the
New Millennium, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 91, 99–101 (2001) (“Disasters breed environmental law. One can
easily trace the origins of several federal statutory schemes to specific ecological calamities.”); Sandra
Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 624 – 25
(2007) (“Crisis can open windows of opportunity and spawn long-lasting solutions that transcend
immediate pressures and political maneuvering.”).
146. Apparently, the frog that placidly allows itself to be cooked as its pot is gradually brought
to a boil is a myth. The truth, according to a nineteenth-century report in the prestigious journal
Nature, is that the gradually heated frog does not go quietly to its death:
Goltz observed that a frog, when placed in water the temperature of which is slowly raised
towards boiling, manifests uneasiness as soon as the temperature reaches 25° C., and
becomes more and more agitated as the heat increases, vainly struggling to get out, and
finally at 42° C., dies in a state of rigid tetanus.
George Henry Lewes, Sensation in the Spinal Cord, 9 NATURE 83, 83 – 84 (1873). Only if its brain has
been removed does the frog react as the popular tale would have it. Id. at 84.
147. See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009);
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 299; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30
ENVTL. L. 241 (2000).
148. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704 (2009).
149. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 61, at 29 (“Responding to
sea-level rise requires careful consideration regarding whether and how particular areas will be
protected with structures, elevated above the tides, relocated landward, or left alone and potentially
given up to the rising sea.”).
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about the environment.150 If adaptation is to occur in a way that protects the
nonhuman as well as the human world, it cannot wait for the inevitable crises to
manifest.
B. Markets Are Not the (Whole) Answer
One might legitimately ask whether changes to property rules are needed to
facilitate climate adaptation. To the extent that the problem is one of misallocation
of limited resources, the market might seem an attractive mechanism for revisiting
that allocation. What role markets should play in climate adaptation is important
to a discussion of property rights changes because an emphasis on markets would
call for change in a different direction than an emphasis on government regulation
or public rights. Markets are better served by strengthening individual rights and
reducing uncertainties about the scope of those rights; by contrast, a regulatory
strategy is best served by weakening individual rights and strengthening the
regulation of public rights or regulatory power.
Markets are, in theory at least, excellent tools for reallocating resources as
individual and societal preferences change. They are inherently flexible, and
therefore able to respond to the need for continual change and to deal with
uncertainties that are gradually reduced. Markets do not demand that a centralized
administrator know at all times what society needs and how to provide for those
needs. Markets can be remarkably creative, developing tools like options,
conditional easements, and land exchanges to facilitate change in the face of
uncertainty. They can allocate risk to those best able or most willing to bear it.
Provided that they allow outsiders to participate,151 markets can allow
150. Reactions to western droughts that have limited irrigation deliveries in recent years are
illustrative. Water users have blamed California’s recent multiyear drought for all the state’s economic
woes, despite evidence that the housing bust has been a far more important factor. See BUS.
FORECASTING CTR., EBERHARDT SCH. OF BUS., UNIV. OF THE PACIFIC, UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE
SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY IN 2009: FISH OR FORECLOSURE (2009), available at http://forecast.
pacific.edu/articles/pacificbfc_fish%20or%20foreclosure.pdf (concluding that the economic impact
of the construction industry collapse dwarfed that of irrigation restrictions). Politicians reacted with
calls to invoke the Endangered Species Act’s “god squad,” which is empowered to authorize the
deliberate extinction of threatened species. See Press Release, Dennis Hollingsworth, Republicans
Urge Governor to Call for Convention of “God Squad” (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://gadblog.
srcar.org/page/24/. Even Senator Dianne Feinstein, usually considered a friend of the environment,
proposed overriding the ESA to increase deliveries to San Joaquin Valley farmers. Dianne Feinstein,
Water is Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2010, at A12. Those efforts have not yet borne fruit, no doubt in
part because 2010 brought a return of relatively normal rainfall. But Congress did pass a droughtdriven appropriations rider in 2003 prohibiting the Bureau of Reclamation from reallocating water
from low-value agriculture to protect the Rio Grande silvery minnow. Pub. L. No. 108-37, § 208(a),
117 Stat. 1827, 1849-50 (2003); see Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 128, at 70–71.
151. Resource markets in the United States have sometimes been limited to historic users.
Grazing permits on federal lands provide the most prominent example. See Pub. Lands Council v.
Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that Secretary of Interior lacked statutory
authority to issue grazing permits to environmental groups who would remove livestock); David G.
Alderson, Buyouts and Conservation Permits: A Market Approach to Address the Federal Public Land Grazing
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environmental interests to purchase the environmental protection they value from
owners who value it less.152
Not surprisingly, market-oriented observers see the development of stronger
markets as an important response to climate disruption. These arguments have
been made most strongly in the context of freshwater resources. Jonathan Adler,
for example, argues that “markets provide a superior institutional framework for
addressing the water management problems global climate change will create.”153
Even without climate change, economists have long contended that more robust
water markets could help address the inefficiencies of the water allocations
established in the nineteenth century, which persist today.154 With the addition of
climate change, the need to revisit historic allocations has become even more
urgent.
No doubt water markets can contribute to climate adaptation. Sales of water
rights by irrigators to cities can produce a win-win outcome for the parties,155
increase the efficiency of water rights allocation, and perhaps offer politically
necessary transition relief to those who give up their former rights.156 Even trading
strictly among irrigators can reduce the economic losses associated with reduced
irrigation deliveries,157 much as the trading of emission rights can reduce the
overall social cost of pollution control.158 That in turn may dial down the political
tensions produced by environmental protection efforts.159 Markets may also have

Problem, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 903, 930–39 (2005) (proposing that Congress adopt a formal
conservation permit process allowing environmental interests to compete for grazing permits).
152. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 123 (detailing experience of Oregon Water Trust buying
water rights to dedicate to instream flows).
153. Jonathan H. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of Climate Change, 31
HAMLINE L. REV. 729, 740 (2008).
154. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS 4–7 (1997);
CHARLES J. MEYERS & RICHARD A. POSNER, NAT’L WATER COMM’N LEGAL STUDY NO. 4,
MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES
47 (1971); NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 260–70 (1973); Andrew P.
Morriss, Real People, Real Resources, and Real Choices: The Case for Market Valuation of Water, 38 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 973, 1009–10 (2006); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy
and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993). For a far more comprehensive listing of sources advocating
expanded use of water markets, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 319–20 n.7 (2000).
155. Adler, supra note 153, at 742 –43.
156. On the question of when financial relief for a change in legal rules is necessary or
desirable, see generally Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 91 (2011).
157. David Sunding et al., Water Markets and the Cost of Improving Water Quality in the San
Francisco Bay/Delta Estuary, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203, 211 (2008).
158. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Regulation: A New Era from
an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8–9 (1991) (describing marketable permit schemes as minimizing
the costs of pollution control).
159. It should be noted, however, that employing a market-based approach does not
automatically eliminate political opposition. Water marketing for environmental protection, for
example, often faces significant political resistance. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 123, at 475–82
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a role to play in the coastal context, where governments might choose to purchase
vulnerable lands or rolling easements.160
Markets alone, however, cannot be the complete answer to the climate
adaptation problem. While markets can produce efficient results between the
parties to a bargain, they do not always account well for externalities. Externalities
are one of the chief reasons that water markets have been difficult to use; states
typically require that water transactions not injure third parties, and that
requirement often proves difficult to meet.161 The nature of water, which is
inescapably interconnected, makes the elimination of external effects
extraordinarily difficult.162
The shortcomings of markets are even more apparent if adaptation is
expected to protect environmental quality, which is a classic public good. Because
of free rider problems, markets typically underprovide public goods.163 If
adaptation is left entirely to market mechanisms, people with resources and strong
individual preferences will be able to realize those preferences, but public goods
will suffer.
Finally, markets will not function properly without sufficient information.
But information about the local effects of climate change is both uncertain and
subject to biased assimilation.164 A large fraction of market participants is likely to
ignore the potential effects of climate change. Although markets can, in principle,
facilitate adaptation to changing conditions,165 they will not do so unless market
players recognize how much change is coming, how fast.166
In sum, market transactions can potentially be used to facilitate climate
adaptation. But they will not be sufficient. Without changes to the relevant
property rules, reallocation will not occur quickly enough, nor will it protect
important public values such as environmental quality.

(chronicling political opposition to voluntary water transfers to instream flows in Oregon); see also
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 333 (2003) (noting that Congress dropped $125 million from aid bill for
Klamath Basin farmers because irrigator group opposed provision that would have allowed its use to
buy land or water rights from willing sellers).
160. See, e.g., Titus, supra note 97, at 1384–87.
161. See, e.g., Bretsen & Hill, supra note 128, at 730–37; Dellapenna, supra note 154, at 351;
George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1988).
162. Smith, supra note 128, at 471.
163. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 76 (1965).
164. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 305
(2000).
165. Morriss, supra note 154, at 988.
166. Coastal development, for example, has continued to boom even in the face of a series of
well-publicized destructive storms. Population growth in coastal counties in the southeast and Gulf
coast regions, the areas most at risk from such storms, has far outpaced national growth. NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, POPULATION TRENDS ALONG
THE COASTAL UNITED STATES 3 (2004), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb
/pdfs/coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf.
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C. Federal Courts Must Play the Primary Role
Legislatures are often the most visible movers in readjusting property rights,
toward either greater or lesser exclusivity. That is as it should be; political
institutions are generally a more legitimate source than courts of large-scale
changes to property rules.167 Nonetheless, courts, even if they remain in the
background, are ultimately the keystone institution because they have the power to
block or to facilitate legislative readjustment. More specifically, the locus of power
lies in the federal courts, because those courts are the arbiters of the takings
doctrine that plays such an important role in limiting the adjustment of property
rights.168
Justice Scalia, in particular, has shown overt hostility since Lucas to changes
in property rules that restrict individual rights. His skepticism in Lucas of “newly
legislated or decreed” restrictions169 has driven states that see the need to
modernize their property law to find (or at least purport to find) the seeds of new
rules in ancient doctrines like nuisance and the public trust. Scalia’s Lucas opinion
sought to cabin that practice by declaring that it is not sufficient for a state simply
to invoke a general common law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.170
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, he sought even more openly to freeze property law
in its tracks. Justice Scalia pines for a long-ago era when, at least as he recounts
history, common law courts denied that they had any power to change the law,
even when existing rules no longer served a useful purpose.171 Apparently, he
believes that protecting expectations formed by the eighteenth century is more
important than having law keep pace with modern realities.
Justice Scalia’s view has yet to gain a majority of the Court, but it is
dangerously close to doing so; he had four votes for it in Stop the Beach
Renourishment. One hopes that he never picks up the decisive fifth vote. That
property law should be static is supported neither by history nor by reason. Well
167. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2022 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2000).
168. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010). Indeed, the power Justice Scalia asserts over state court takings is even broader than that
which the Court has claimed over legislative decisions. Legislative decisions cannot be invalidated for
failing takings review; the Court can only order compensation. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992) (“Of
course, the State may elect to rescind its regulation and thereby avoid having to pay compensation for a
permanent deprivation.” (emphasis added)). But according to Justice Scalia, the same choice does not
apply to a judicial taking; a judicial decision that works a taking is simply subject to reversal. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2607.
169. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
170. Id. at 1031.
171. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606; Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 472 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for upholding a state court’s “routine
exercise of common law decision-making,” to bring the law into conformity with reason and common
sense, on the grounds that the common law did not allow such decision making at the time the
Constitution was adopted).
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before they were willing to openly admit to changing the law, the common law
courts engaged in some dramatic restructuring of property rights. The most
familiar example is perhaps the narrowing of nuisance law, which evolved from
providing landowners nearly absolute protection against pollution to allowing
factories substantial license to pollute with little acknowledged change in
doctrine.172 According to Joel Brenner, the judges of the industrial revolution era
“believed as a bedrock principle that general propositions automatically decide
concrete cases,” even as they dramatically reshaped the application of those
principles.173 I have no particular desire to defend the reengineering of nuisance
law to accommodate factory pollution, only to express skepticism that Justice
Scalia would see that change as a judicial taking, even though it did limit
preexisting property rights.
The new, utilitarian version of nuisance law developed in the nineteenth
century was implicitly justified by the perceived desirability of the economic
expansion industrialization made possible. Whether one views that expansion as
desirable or not, there is no question that it enjoyed broad support at the time, and
that the law changed to accommodate that shift in goals. It is just as legitimate for
legislatures and courts to revise property rules today in response to newly
recognized impacts on resources, rising marginal costs of resource exploitation
with crowding, or evolving societal goals.174
Change should not come too fast; the costs of impulsiveness are just as real
as those of delay.175 But as I have argued elsewhere, there is good reason to
believe that legal change will come, if anything, too slowly rather than too fast.
Institutional and psychological resistance to change combine to anchor the status
quo.176
Courts do not, therefore, need to see themselves as the last bulwark against
ill-considered legislative impulsiveness. Rather, they should be chary of standing in
the way when the more politically responsive branches impose new or heightened
general restrictions on individual property rights. Such restrictions require strong
political support in order to surmount the usual public choice barriers to
lawmaking that provides small benefits to the diffuse public while imposing
focused costs on the economically powerful few. Only in extraordinary
circumstances will they amount to unfair majoritarian exploitation of the
propertied minority.

172. Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403,
431 (1974); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property
Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 809 (1979); John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law
and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 157 (1983).
173. Brenner, supra note 172, at 433.
174. Doremus, Takings and Transitions, supra note 7, at 18 –21.
175. Id. at 14–18.
176. Id. at 21–24.
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Consider, for example, Lucas, which the Court majority regarded as so unfair
that it and its ilk categorically require compensation without regard to the
importance of the ends served. The South Carolina law applied to all similarly
situated properties, that is to all property located seaward of a setback line
determined through a public process based on scientific and historical evidence.177
Surely only a minority of South Carolinians own such property, but that minority
is not likely to be politically powerless. Moreover, although Justice Scalia made
much of the fact that under prior law others had been allowed to build in the zone
now considered off limits, early builders did not get off scot-free. The legislation
forbade rebuilding of homes destroyed by storms, and required at least some
owners of developed land to nourish the beach to counteract the erosive effects of
their structures.178 It did not single out David Lucas to solve a public problem
entirely at his own expense; rather it identified a public problem caused by a class
of persons, and required that all of them contribute to the solution.
The point here is that while courts do need to oversee the fairness of
property transitions at some level, they do not need to start from the assumption
that any restriction on property rights is likely to be unfair. In fact, legislatures are
often quite solicitous of the interests of property owners, willing and able to strike
a balance between preventing harm to public resources and protecting the
interests of landowners faced with unexpected restrictions. The role of the courts
should be to demand that legislatures or state courts articulate a legitimate reason
for a change in property rules; apply the change to all similarly situated properties;
justify any boundaries it draws between classes of property; and justify any
variances or special permits it offers, since such relief valves carry the potential for
improperly leaving a small group to bear a larger burden.
Specifically in the context of climate change, the federal courts should
recognize the realities of the problem and that sufficient political barriers exist to
prevent foolish impulsiveness. They should not erect artificial barriers to legal
changes, such as new coastal setbacks or restrictions on water diversion for lowvalue historic uses, that precede certainty that climate change is causing or will
cause specified harms. They should be sympathetic to attempts to identify and
address in advance the need to adapt. And for the most part they should leave it to
state legislative bodies and courts to determine when economic transition relief is
necessary or desirable.
At the state level, where property rights are typically defined and redefined,
courts and legislatures should continue to work together as they long have done.
Courts may need to declare new principles or make old ones explicit, while leaving
the details of implementation to the politically responsive legislature or technically
expert administrative bodies. The development of California’s public trust

177.
178.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (2010).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1074 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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doctrine provides a good example of that sort of cooperation. In 1983, in
response to litigation challenging the gradual draining of Mono Lake to provide
water to Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court issued a blockbuster decision
holding that the public trust doctrine gave the state the authority to revise
appropriative water rights.179 But the court did not itself make those revisions.
Instead, it remanded to the State Water Resources Control Board to reconsider
the appropriations in light of the public trust values at stake.180 The end result,
after protracted litigation and administrative proceedings, was an agreement that
reduced but did not halt diversions, established minimum tributary streamflows,
and persuaded Los Angeles to implement serious water conservation efforts.181
The Mono Lake process makes good use of the institutional capabilities of courts,
legislatures, and agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
Adapting to climate disruption in a way that protects not only human but
also environmental interests will require revision of existing property rules. Coastal
states will need to be able to discourage, and perhaps even to prohibit, new
construction on lands vulnerable to sea level rise or needed for migration of
coastal wetlands. Western states will need to be able to reduce water deliveries to
low-value agricultural users, and to require that more water remain in streams to
meet the needs of aquatic ecosystems. Evolution of property rights in response to
climate change will have to occur rapidly, before the changing climate produces a
crisis.
That evolutionary process will be a difficult one, because it unsettles
established property rights on which people have come to rely. Its details are
appropriately left to the states, with federal encouragement and technical
assistance. State courts, legislatures, and agencies have long worked cooperatively
to design and implement property doctrine; that process should continue. It is
crucial, however, that the federal courts not interfere by using takings doctrine to
freeze state property law. Rather, the federal courts should recognize that the
evolution of property law is a healthy, longstanding process; that evolution can
legitimately run in the direction of reduced individual and increased communal or
public rights as the other way; and that state institutions can generally be relied on
to provide for fair transitions between property regimes, with limited supervision
to protect against undue favoritism or singling out. Given the difficulty of the
adaptation task, government at all levels needs to be part of the solution, rather
than part of the problem.
179. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y. v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983).
180. Id. at 728 –29.
181. The aftermath of the Mono Lake litigation is explored in Craig Anthony Arnold & Leigh
A. Jewel, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake
Case, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1177, 1181–82 (2008).
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